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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Melvin Arthur McCabe appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction
and order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Mr. McCabe asserts that the
district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a mental health
evaluation and make a determination as to Mr. McCabe's competency to represent
himself. Additionally, Mr. McCabe asserts that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In January of 2013, Jerome Police Officer Summers arrested Mr. McCabe for
driving without privileges.

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) p.4.) 1

Subsequently, Officer Summers located a cigarette pack on Mr. McCabe that contained
a white crystal substance that was later identified as methamphetamine.

(PSI, p.4.)

Inside Mr. McCabe's vehicle, Officer Summers also discovered a glass pipe with
residue, two digital scales, and a plastic tube. (PSI, p.4.)
Mr. McCabe was originally charged with one count of possession of a controlled
substance, felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a); one count of driving without
privileges, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 18-8001; one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A; and one count of failure to
provide proof of insurance (second offense), misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 491232. (R., pp.67-69.) Additionally, the State sought a persistent violator enhancement,

1

All page cites to the PSI and its attachments refer to the 38-page electronic document
entitled "41357 State v. McCabe Confidential Exhibits."
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under I

§1

14,

on the fact

Mr. McCabe had four prior felony

the

filed an Amended Information Part 2

convictions. (R., pp.70-71.)

charging an enhancement, under I.C. § 37-2739, based on a prior misdemeanor
conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia.

(See R., pp.404-405.) That

enhancement allowed the district court to impose a sentence that was twice the
standard maximum for a possession of a controlled substance conviction. (See I.C. §
37-2739; Tr. 5/13/13, p.12, Ls.5-10.)
Counsel was appointed for Mr. McCabe, but Mr. McCabe subsequently filed a
notice of appearance under Faretta v. California, 422 U

806 (1975), and requested

that the district court allow him to represent himself. (R., pp.78-83.)

After a hearing,

the district court allowed Mr. McCabe to proceed prose. (R., p.106.) Mr. McCabe then
filed a suppression motion that was denied by the district court. (R., pp.267-280, 304321.) Later, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. McCabe pleaded guilty to one count of
possession of a controlled substance and to the enhancement, under I .C. § 37-2739.
(Tr. 5/13/13, p.8, Ls.2-8, 21-23, p.11, Ls.19-25.)

In exchange, the State agreed to

dismiss the remaining counts, as well as the persistent violator enhancement, and
recommend a unified sentence of fourteen years, with six years fixed. (Tr. 5/13/13, p.8,
Ls.9-17.)
At sentencing, the district court followed the State's recommendation and
imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with six years fixed. (R., pp.431-437; Tr.
7/12/13, p.18, Ls.13-15.) Mr. McCabe filed, prose, a Notice of Appeal that was timely
from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.440-442.)
Mr. McCabe subsequently filed, pro se, a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea under
I.C.R. 33(c) (hereinafter, Rule 33(c)). (R., pp.477-483; see also affidavit in support of
2

motion, R., pp.488-491.) To substantiate the claims in that Rule 33(c),
motion for a competency evaluation, and a motion for

also filed a

readings and hair follicle

analysis to offer evidence that he was in a state of methamphetamine induced
incompetence during the proceedings against him

(R., pp.492-494; GPS motion -

augmented to the record on April 3, 2014.) In his motion for a competency evaluation,
he said that he was under the influence of methamphetamine, which made him "unable
to appreciate and understand the nature or consequences of waiving counsel or
entering a plea of guilty to the crime charged." (R., pp.492-494.)
In his Rule 33(c) motion and supporting affidavit, Mr. McCabe asserted, among
other claims, that his use of methamphetamine "prevented him from having the mental
necessary to be held responsible for a crime related to his drug addiction and/or
have the prerequisite competency to waive the constitutional right to counsel or to assist
and prepare a defense to the extent that a waiver of counsel would/could be held
constitutionally valid." 2

(R., pp.489-490.)

He went on to say that the district court

recognized this diminished capacity, and therefore should have sua sponte ordered a
competency hearing to "determine the extent of defendant's mental disease or defect
from toxic and lethal methamphetamine use or to determine if defendant was suffering
from drug induced mental incompetence on a level that made him unable to understand
the nature and/or consequences of a waiver of counsel or guilty plea." (R., p.490.)
The district court denied Mr. McCabe's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (See
Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, I.C.R. 33(c)
(hereinafter, Rule 33(c) Decision) - augmented to the record on April 3, 2014.)

In

Mr. McCabe made several other claims as part of his Rule 33(c) motion that are not
being challenged on appeal.
2

3

Mr. McCabe's claim that he was under the influence of methamphetamine
during

proceedings,

district court said that, based on

hearing, it was

"satisfied that the defendant made a valid waiver of counsel and that the waiver was not
the result of being under the influence of controlled substances of any kind or any claim
of diminished capacity." (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.14.) Additionally, the district court said
that, during the change of plea hearing, it asked if Mr. McCabe was under the influence
of any drugs or alcohol, and Mr. McCabe said he was not. (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.14.)
Therefore, the district court found that the record proved that Mr. McCabe was not
under the influence of drugs during the proceedings, and thus his plea was known,
intelligent, and voluntary. (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.15.)
The district court also denied Mr. McCabe's motion for GPS readings and hair
follicle analysis. It explained that the GPS readings would not produce any evidence of
drug use because the ankle monitor he wore only tracked his location, not the ingestion
of drugs. (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.9.) In regards to the hair follicle analysis, it stated that
it would be of no use to Mr. McCabe since hair follicle analysis does not indicate if the
individual was using drugs at any particular time. (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.9.)
The district court denied Mr. McCabe's motion for a competency evaluation as
well. (Rule 33(c) Decision, pp.7-8.) It stated that it was "at all relevant times familiar
with defendant's substance abuse history, however, the court was also satisfied that his
history of substance use did not impair his ability to understand the proceeding leading
up to the entry of his Judgment of Conviction in this matter." (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.8.)
It said that Mr. McCabe was incarcerated for approximately 45 days before his decision
to represent himself, and it determined, as a result of the Faretta inquiry, that his
decision was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.8.) It said that
4

"[a]t no time did
suggest to

behavior, actions, conduct or writing's [sic] ever

court that he did not understand the proceedings against him." (Rule

33(c) Decision, p.8.) The district court also said that Mr. McCabe never raised the issue
of his competency prior to his sentencing and "at no time did this court have any doubt
as to the capacity of [sic} competency of the defendant to understand the nature and
consequences of his plea." (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.8.)

5

ISSUES
1. Did the district court
its discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a
mental health evaluation and make a determination as to Mr. McCabe's
competency to represent himself?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. McCabe's Rule 33(c)
motion to with draw his guilty plea and his accompanying motion for a retroactive
competency evaluation?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed to Sua Sponte Order A Mental
Health Evaluation And Make A Determination As To Mr. McCabe's Competency To
Represent Himself

A.

Introduction
Mr. McCabe asserts that there was substantial evidence that he was incompetent

when he waived his right to counsel.

Therefore, he contends that relief should be

granted because the district court's failure to order a mental health evaluation to
determine his competency to represent himself violated
his rights under I.C. §§ 18-210
B.

rights to due process, and

18-211.

Standard of Review
When there is a clear abuse of discretion, the trial court's decision not to order a

mental health evaluation will not be upheld on appeal.

State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho

774, 777 (2009). An appellate court reviews a district court's decision not to order a
mental health evaluation for an abuse of discretion and examines "whether there was
sufficient, competent, even if conflicting, evidence to support the district court's
determination of competency." Id.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua Sponte Order A
Competency Hearing Because The District Court's Own Statements, And Those
of Mr. McCabe. Demonstrated That Mr. McCabe Was Not Competent To
Represent Himself
Mr. McCabe asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to

sua sponte order a mental health evaluation and make a determination as to
Mr. McCabe's competency to represent himself, because there was sufficient evidence
to raise a bona fide doubt as to his competency.
7

v. Robinson,

A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent.
383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). And "he may not waive his right to counsel or

guilty

unless he does so 'competently and intelligently,"' Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396
(1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938)).

To guarantee such

protection, Idaho Code§ 18-210 states that "[n]o person who as a result of a mental
disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist
in his own defense shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission
of an offense so long as such incapacity endures." Further, I.C. § 18-211 states that
[w]henever there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed as
set forth in
18-210, Idaho Code, the court shall appoint
least
one ( 1) qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist or shall request the
one
director of the department of health and welfare to designate at
(1) qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report
upon the mental condition of the defendant to assist counsel with defense
or understand the proceedings.
Therefore, "a trial judge must conduct a competency hearing, regardless of whether one
is requested, whenever the evidence before the judge raises a bona fide doubt about
the defendant's competence to stand trial. A bona fide doubt exists if there is substantial
evidence of incompetence."

State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 778 (Ct. App. 2009)

(citing Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567. 603-04 (9th Cir.2004)).

However, because

determinations of competency are inherently problematic, the Hawkins Court explained
that "[aJn individual can have the capacity to understand the proceedings but lack a
rational

understanding,

thereby

resulting

in

incompetence."

Id.

A

rational

understanding was in turn defined as having "a sufficient contact with reality." Id.
The Hawkins decision was prior to the Idaho Supreme Court's clarification of
fundamental error in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).

After Perry, this Court

applies a three-part test to determine whether an error is fundamental: (1) whether the
8

alleged error violates an unwaived constitutional right; (2) whether the error is plain
obvious from the record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision; and, (3) whether the defendant can establish that the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings.

Id. at 226.

Here, the district court's failure to order a

competency hearing sua sponte (or at least retroactively, as argued below) satisfies this
test. First, Mr. McCabe never waived his right to due process at his Faretta hearing.
Second, the error is clear from the record as described below. And finally, the error in
this case affected the outcome of the proceedings because Mr. McCabe was left on his
own to represent himself while he was incompetent. This was tantamount to a denial of
counsel and ultimately led to Mr. McCabe to plead guilty.
In Hawkins, the Court acknowledged that the defendant was capable of
preparing and arguing his own defense, largely without the help of standby counsel." Id.
at 779. The Court also noted that the defendant was "alert and coherent" during the
pretrial and trial process and "filed numerous prose motions." Id. Indeed, Hawkins was
even able to represent himself at trial with the help of standby counsel. Id. However,
because of his strange behavior and "delusional characteristics during pretrial and trial,"
the Court said that the district court should have realized that Mr. Hawkins "might have
been out of touch with reality and did not have a rational understanding of the
proceedings."

Id.

Therefore, the Court held that the district court "should have

entertained a reasonable doubt about Hawkins' mental competency either to stand trial
or represent himself." Id. at 783. Thus, the Court found that the district court abused its
discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation and make a
competency determination, so it vacated Mr. Hawkins's judgment of conviction and
remanded the case. Id.
9

Mr. McCabe's behavior leading up to and during his

hearing,

should have indicated to the Court that there was a reasonable doubt as to
Mr. McCabe's ability to proceed prose. Indeed, the district court even stated that it was
concerned about Mr. McCabe's ability

to communicate.

Similar to the situation in

Hawkins, the district court noted that Mr. McCabe could write motions well but said that
it was concerned because, based on its prior experience with Mr. McCabe, "[m]any

times" Mr. McCabe's "comments seem disjointed, confused, not full sentences .... " (Tr.
3/4/13, p.11, Ls.1-13.) Mr. McCabe actually demonstrated some of this behavior later in
the Faretta hearing. When he was asked about whether his request to proceed prose
had anything to do with his public defender, Mr. McCabe said that he thought she did a
good job even though there was a disagreement in the beginning, but

he exhibited

an odd, almost frenetic thought pattern when he said
I just - Just like I said before I've lost confidence in her, but it's not to say
she's a bad attorney, you know. But, you know, and it's no reflection on
her, but - You know, I know we're on record and I'm not going to put
myself in a position to - well, I'm not going to appeal - You know what,
Your Honor, push come to shove, I will not appeal my ineffectiveness. I
won't. You know, I'll shove it down my own throat as far as admitting that
I'm satisfied with her, because there is a lot to be said about that.
(Tr. 3/4/13, p.14, Ls.8-20.)
Additionally, the district court was obviously concerned when it noted that shortly
before his request to proceed pro se, Mr. McCabe made strong claims that he actually
did need a lawyer. The district court said "I believe when we were here a week or two
ago, your indication was that you really needed a lawyer because you're facing the
potential of life? (Tr., 3/4/13, p.9, Ls.23-25 - p.10, L.1.)

In response, Mr. McCabe said

"Yes, I - Yeah, I did relay that to the court." (Tr. 3/4/13, p.10, Ls.2-3.) The court then
asked why his decision had changed. (Tr. 3/4/13, p.10, L.4.) Mr. McCabe said "Well,
10

Honor, I just

I feel that I, you know, after reviewing the evidence

stuff like

as long as everybody plays aboveboard I feel that this thing could be resolved
before trial. I really do." (Tr. 3/4/13, p.10, Ls.5-10.)
Mr. McCabe's irrelevant and odd statements, his vacillations between coherent
statements and confused ramblings, and his sudden shifts in strategy when facing such
a long sentence should have indicated to the district court that Mr. McCabe did not have
a sufficient contact with reality, and thus there was a reasonable doubt as to
Mr. McCabe's competence.
Nevertheless, the district court, in its memorandum decision on Mr. McCabe's
Rule 33(c) motion addressed Mr. McCabe's claim that the court should have sua sponte
ordered a competency evaluation and said it was "satisfied that the defendant made a
valid waiver of counsel and that the waiver was not the result of being under the
influence of controlled substances or any claim of diminished capacity." (Rule 33(c)
Decision, p.14.) Additionally, it said that while it "was at all relevant times familiar with
the defendant's substance abuse history" it was nonetheless "satisfied that his history of
substance use did not impair his ability to understand the proceeding leading up to the
entry of his Judgment of Conviction in this matter." (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.8.) Also, it
pointed out that Mr. McCabe was in the Jerome County Jail for "approximately 45 days"
prior to his decision to represent himself. (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.8.)
The

district

court's

knowledge

of

Mr.

McCabe's

severe,

long-term

methamphetamine abuse offered more evidence that he was potentially not competent
to represent himself. And, unfortunately, an extended period of time in a county jail, is
not definitive proof that the defendant has not used drugs during that period; it is
common knowledge that drugs are often available to incarcerated defendants. (See

11

Washington

Times,

Drugs

Inside

Prison

Walls,

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 0/jan/27/drugs-inside-prison-walls/?page=all,
(January 27, 2010).
Mr. McCabe asserts that his actions and statements provided substantial
evidence of incompetence. Therefore, the district court should have recognized that
there was a bona fide doubt about his competence and sua sponte ordered a
competency hearing prior to allowing him to proceed pro se.

Therefore, the district

court abused its discretion.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. McCabe's Rule 33(c)
Motion To VVithdraw His Guilty Plea And His Accompanying Motion For a Retroactive
Competency Evaluation

A.

Introduction
Mr. McCabe asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary because, due to his long-term use of methamphetamine, he was not
competent when he pleaded guilty, and the district court's denial of his Rule 33(c)
motion was premature because it failed to grant Mr. McCabe's motion for a retroactive
competency determination.

8.

Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a district court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw

a plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hayes, 138 Idaho 761, 765 (Ct. App. 2003).

12

Mr. McCabe's Guilty Plea Was Not Knowing, Intelligent, And Voluntary Because,
Due To His Methamphetamine Abuse, He Was Not Competent When He
Pleaded Guilty

"A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is
imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant
to withdraw defendant's plea." I.C.R. 33(c). The Rule requires a higher standard of
proof for post-sentence motions. See State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568, 571 (2011 ). "A
showing of manifest injustice is necessary in order to withdraw a guilty plea after
sentencing." Id.
"Because a guilty plea by a criminal defendant waives certain constitutional
rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the
right of confrontation, a guilty plea will only be upheld if the entire record demonstrates
that the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." State v. Heredia,
144 Idaho 95, 97 (2007).

"Manifest injustice occurs if this standard requiring a

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver is not met." Id.
A court determines whether a plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly through a
three-part inquiry involving:
(1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to
confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself;
and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of
pleading guilty.
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484 (1993).

"On appeal, Idaho law requires that

voluntariness of the guilty plea and waiver must be reasonably inferred from the record
as a whole." Id.
13

Mr.

that the

contends that

withdraw the plea

his

injustice necessary to

was not knowing or voluntary. His plea was

not knowing or voluntary because, as a result of his long-term methamphetamine use,
he was not competent when he pleaded guilty, and thus he did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his rights. Mr. McCabe asserts the district court prematurely denied
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because a retroactive competency evaluation
would have proven that Mr. McCabe was not competent when he entered his plea.
Mr. McCabe is indigent and had no means to pursue a retroactive competency
evaluation.
Further, as

above, there was sufficient evidence to show that he was not

competent when he waived his right to counsel. Given that the district court failed to
sua sponte order a competency hearing at that time, the district court should not have

denied Mr. McCabe's motion for a retroactive competency hearing. Because the entire
record does not support the fact that Mr. McCabe waived his rights voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently, Mr. McCabe asserts that he has shown that manifest
injustice occurred when the district court denied his motion for a retroactive competency
evaluation and prematurely denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Even if this
Court cannot say that he was incompetent, there is at least a question which warranted
a retroactive competency evaluation. Thus, Mr. McCabe asserts the district court
abused its discretion.

14

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. McCabe respectfully requests that this Court vacate
his judgment of conviction and remand the case for a competency determination.
Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the Rule33(c) order and remand the
case for withdrawal of his guilty plea or, at a minimum, a competency determination.
DATED this 16th day of May, 2014.

REED P. ANDERSON .
Deputy State Appellate ~ublic Defender
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